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Abstract 
 
As a line between digital and social life is diminishing, security concerns of information 
systems and information per se, also developing and maintaining system security are gaining 
a rising attention. Nevertheless, the existing practices report on numerous cases when security 
aspects were considered only at the end of the system development process, thus, missing the 
systematic security analysis during system and software requirements and design stages. 
Misuse case diagrams are one of the possible ways to relate security analysis and system 
functional requirements definition. Their main goal is to model negative scenarios with 
respect to the defined system functional requirement elicitation and analysis. Despite this 
fundamental advantage, misuse cases tend to be rather imprecise; they do not comply with 
security risk management strategies, and, thus, could lead to misinterpretation of the security-
related concepts. Such limitations could potentially result in poor security solutions. Quite 
often, the organizations have to adopt their own security solutions to safeguard their resources 
and assets.   
In this thesis we will apply a systematic approach to understand how misuse case 
diagrams could help model organisational assets, potential system risks, and security 
requirements to mitigate these risks. More specifically we will align misuse case constructs 
with the concepts of the domain model for the information systems security risk management 
(ISSRM). In addition, based on such an ISSRM and language alignment we will investigate 
and develop rules to translate misuse case diagrams to the Secure Tropos model. 
The contribution of this research has several benefits. Firstly, it will potentially help 
understand how misuse case could deal with security risk management. Secondly, it will 
define method to support reasoning for the security requirements introduction and 
implementation in the developed system. Finally the transformation to the Secure Tropos 
would potentially help developers (and other system stakeholders) to understand why security 
solutions are important and what different stakeholder trade-offs are.  
We plan to validate our results where the quality model regarding its 
comprehensibility will be measured for the misuse case diagrams. 
We believe that such alignment of the misuse cases with ISSRM and misuse case 
diagram transformation to the goal-oriented modelling language will be beneficial to system 
and software developers. Firstly, it will allow understanding security concerns at the earlier 
stages of development. Secondly it will help to view security problems from different angles, 
understanding different security development perspectives. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
 
In this chapter we provide the introduction and the scope of our research. We will identify the 
research question. We introduce the Information System and the motivation for this research. 
Also we present the structure of the research work. 
1.1 Scope 
During the last two decades, line between digital and social life is diminishing, leading that 
modern society is mainly dependent on information system (IS) and its security. The demand 
for security of IS is constantly growing, also developing and maintaining system security is 
gaining a rising attention. Considering IS security at early stages of software development is 
also acknowledged [28]. Security breaches in IS can lead to the negative consequences. The 
practitioners of IS security must inspect security threats with negative perspective from the 
very beginning of IS development process. Consideration of security at early development 
stages assists to analyse and estimate security measures of the IS to be developed. 
This research discusses the security risk management at requirement elicitation and 
analysis stage. We will answer the question “how security risk management could be 
addressed using Misuse Case diagrams?” To answer this question we analyse misuse cases 
proposed by Sindre and Opdahl [3, 17]. Misuse case diagrams are one of the possible 
techniques to relate security analysis and functional requirements of software systems. Their 
main goal is to model negative scenarios with respect to functional requirements. Misuse 
cases are already proved to be useful in the industries [25]. Existing misuse cases is a simple 
language, since it contains quite few elements to model security concerns. However the 
previous analysis  shows the limitations of misuse cases in detail [17]. In this analysis, 
Matulevicius  et al. highlighted that currently misuse cases do not have the concrete 
constructs to comply with security risk management strategies. Mainly, because of some 
missing constructs to model the security risk concepts. Likewise, distinct constructs for 
representing security risk concepts are not available. Thus, could lead to misinterpretation of 
the security-related concepts. Such limitations could potentially result in poor security 
solutions. This challenges to look for improvement of the misuse cases. In this research we 
apply a systematic approach to understand how misuse case diagrams could help to model 
organisational assets, potential system risks, and security requirements to mitigate these risks. 
More specifically we introduce new constructs to extend the misuse cases in order to align the 
constructs of misuse case diagram with the concepts of information systems security risk 
management (ISSRM) domain model [18]. The benefit of syntactical and semantic extensions 
is that they bring the missing semantics in to the language. The domain model is a touchstone 
to verify if the concepts presented in misuse cases are acceptable and appropriate for security 
risk management. 
1.2 Information System 
The term information system is best defined in the context of domain it is used for. We prefer 
to choose the definition of information system as, “A system for dissemination of data 
between persons - potentially, to increase their knowledge” [30]. Our goal is to comprise 
information technology i.e. system used for spreading of data and people's activities in this 
work as information system. 
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1.3 Information System Security Engineering 
Security is usually seen in two different ways, dedicated malicious act and/or accidental harm 
to the system or to the organization. Here we take the definition as “security is the degree to 
which malicious harm is prevented, detected, and reacted.” [13]. Security covers broad range 
of areas including financial, environmental, information system. Here, we will only work with 
the security concepts at design stage of the information system. 
1.4 Security Risk Management 
Security risk is a very general concept and applies to different domain. Risk can be seen as 
combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequence. Risk management 
(RM) is defined as “coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to 
risk” [35]. Risk management can be related to finance, organization, environment and security 
etc. Security risk management encompasses three processes: risk assessment, risk mitigation, 
and evaluation and assessment. In this work we will only focus on the aspects of security risk 
management for information system at early requirement elicitation and analysis stage.  
1.5 Motivation 
Now days security has become a requirement for information technology and IS per se 
instead of an option but it is only seen during the later phases of the development process [3]. 
This approach often leads to threats and vulnerabilities that provide a potential for 
exploitation of IS. 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
The structure of the thesis is organised as follows: In Part I, we describe the related 
background knowledge and ISSRM domain model. Moreover, we discuss other security risk 
management methods and security modelling languages. In Part II, we develop Security Risk-
oriented Misuse Case (SROMUC) and illustrate SROMUC approach through an online 
banking IS [1, 31]. Then, we provide the concept alignment of SROMUC to ISSRM. Section 
III measure the comprehensibility of the proposed models. In part IV, we discuss, conclude 
our work and present areas for future work. 
1.7 PART I, Background 
This section contains two chapters. The second chapter introduces the Information System 
Security Risk Management (ISSRM) domain model and its process and the overview of the 
current practices and research related to security risk management approaches. The third 
chapter discuss the security modelling languages that are already aligned to security risk 
management concepts. 
1.8 PART II, Contribution 
This section contains two chapters. The fourth chapter provides the alignment of MUC to 
ISSRM domain model and introduces the Security Risk-oriented MUC (SROMUC). The fifth 
chapter introduces the transformation from SROMUC to secure tropos and vice versa.  
1.9 PART III, Validation 
This section contains one chapter. The chapter discuss and measure the comprehensibility of 
the SROMUC. Also, we will investigate the threats to validity of our proposal. 
PART IV, Conclusion and Future Work 
This section summarizes the major findings and discusses the future work. It also shows the 
conclusion and highlights of the contribution. 
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Chapter 2  
Information System Security Risk Management Domain Model 
 
This chapter introduces the Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) domain 
model along with other information system security risk management approaches and 
methods. 
2.1 Risk Management 
The most generally agreed upon the definition of risk is it is defined as a combination of the 
probability of an event and its consequences [35]. Following this definition, RM is defined as 
coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation with regard to risk. Depending on 
the context, RM can address various kinds of issues. For example, risks can be related to the 
organisation's management (i.e., poor health of key personnel in regards to the business), 
finance (i.e., related to investment), environment (i.e., pollution), or security etc.  
Security Risk Management is a process of identification and analysis of safety and 
security hazards to the system, their assessment and identifies the risk level of those hazards 
and also providing the mitigation strategies to those hazards with the aim of decreasing the 
risk by decreasing or eliminating its impact.  
2.2.1 Risk Management Methods 
Risk management methods define the methods to deal with security risk management 
activities. Following are few of the methods widely used: 
 
2.2.1.1 EBIOS - An acronym for “Expression des Besoinset Identification des Objectifs de 
Sécurité” [32]. An expression of requirements and identification of security objectives is a 
methodological approach towards identification of IS security risks and proposes suitable 
security objectives and requirements. It was developed by DCSSI( general direction of 
Information system security) of French Defense Ministry. EBIOS consider all the entities 
including technical (software, hardware, network) and non-technical (human, organization 
and physical safety) aspects. The process includes context and environmental analysis, 
security requirement evaluation, risk Analysis, identification of security Objectives, and 
determination of security requirements. 
 
2.2.1.2 MEHARI - An acronym for “Methode Harmoniséed' Analyse du 
RisqueInformatique“ or Harmonized Risk Analysis Method is an information system security 
risk analysis and risk management method developed by CLUSIF (French association of 
information security professionals) [33]. The method entirely depends on organizations needs 
and circumstances and guarantees the suitable strategy of the security risk management. 
MEHARI focuses on risk assessment and risk management techniques and works in different 
modules including security stakes analysis and classification by identifying and evaluating 
potential risks and their consequences, evaluation guide for security services by assessing the 
level of information system security and focusing on the main weaknesses of the system, risk 
analysis guide provides the description of security requirements for safeguarding the IS. 
 
2.2.1.3 OCTAVE - Octave is a process-driven methodology  to identify priorities and manage 
information security risks [4]. It is risk-based strategic assessment and planning technique for 
information security which helps organizations to define the essential components of a 
systematic information security risk assessment framework. Three OCTAVE methodologies 
were developed to manage risks, OCTAVE® was designed for large organizations, 
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OCTAVE-S was designed for small organization and OCTAVE allegro also known as next 
generation of OCTAVE which was designed to optimize the process of assessing information 
security risks in order for organization to obtain sufficient results with a small investment in 
time. Octave helps organizations to develop qualitative risk evaluation criteria based on 
operational risk tolerances, identify assets that are critical to the mission of the organization, 
identify vulnerabilities and threats to the critical assets, determine and evaluate potential 
consequences of the threats to organizations and finally to initiate corrective actions to 
mitigate risks and create practice-based protection strategy. 
 
2.2.1.4 CRAMM - CRAMM is a risk analysis and management methodology  developed by 
Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) of government of United 
Kingdom focusing on the IS security of the governmental departments [34]. Later on the 
methodology was redeveloped by Siemens Enterprise to make it a complete approach and tool 
for information system security and recommends the quantitative risk estimation. The 
CRAMM is composed of three phases containing asset identification and evaluation by 
defining the boundary of the analysis and valuing the physical and soft assets in a quantitative 
way, threat and vulnerability assessment by identifying the potential threats and 
vulnerabilities and their severity. Threat and vulnerabilities are calculated by measuring the 
risk with respect to the information of assets, and countermeasure selection and 
recommendation is a way to manage by providing a list of countermeasures to be applied to 
IS to mitigate the risk. 
 
2.2.1.5 SQUARE - SQUARE is a nine step process, which elicits, categorizes and priorities 
security requirements [23]. Security requirements are specified before the critical architectural and 
design decision to get the most benefit out of this methodology. In this way the critical business 
risk can be addressed at the requirement engineering stage. The nine steps of the SQUARE 
method includes agree on definitions, identify security goals, develop artifacts to support security 
requirements, perform risk assessment, elicitation technique, elicit requirement, categorize and 
prioritize requirements, and requirement inspection. 
2.2.2 Why ISSRM? 
There are various approaches, methodologies and standards related to security risk 
management. ISSRM is a result of already existing methodologies and standards and cover 
the weaknesses of the previous approaches and includes their advantages. ISSRM is not 
specific to one organization but rather it covers the security risk management of all 
organizations considering their assets, risks and their treatment. Table 2.1 shows the 
comparison of ISSRM with other approaches. Risk Management Approach/Method column 
defines the methods used for security risk management. IS Based and Risk Management 
Based approach columns defines whether the method uses an IS and risk management 
approach. The alignment of modelling languages defines if a risk management method 
supports modelling languages. 
Table 2.1 Comparison of Risk Management Approaches and Methods 
Risk Management 
Approach/Method 
IS Based Approach Risk Management Based 
Approach 
Alignment of 
Modelling 
Languages 
EBIOS Yes Yes No 
MEHARI Yes Yes No 
OCTAVE Yes Yes No 
CRAMM Yes Yes No 
SQUARE Yes Yes No 
ISSRM Yes Yes Yes 
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2.3 ISSRM Domain Model 
Information systems (IS’s) are the baseline of the business in today’s era. In many 
organizations, survival and even existence without extensive use of information system is 
inconceivable, and information system plays an important role in organizations productivity. 
Information systems are widely used in distributed environment therefore security in this 
context is an important issue in order to run and different security risk management 
techniques has been applied to secure the business. Security Risk Management has evolved 
from time to time and different security standards have been adopted.  
Information system security risk management (ISSRM) domain model is a framework 
which addresses the most important points for handling the security related issues in an 
information system domain [18]. The domain model is defined after a careful survey of the 
risk management standards, security related standards and security risk management methods 
and software engineering frameworks. This reference model defines the fundamental concepts 
of ISSRM as collected from different security standards of risk management and other 
sources. The focus of ISSRM reference model is to secure the information system. ISSRM 
reference model is mainly structured into three different conceptual categories as shown in the 
Fig 2.1. 
 
2.3.1 Asset-related concepts: It deals to protect some properties that have some value to an 
organization and the criteria to assure protection of those properties. 
Asset: The resources and properties of an organization having some value that help an 
organization to achieve certain objectives.  
Business Asset: An information processes that comply with the mission of organization to 
achieve certain objectives that benefit the business.  
IS Asset: The elements of an information system required by the business asset to perform 
certain task (i-e: use of computer to perform certain task). Example: online transfer of funds 
in a bank, because the transaction will utilize the IS Asset to benefit some entity.  
Security Criterion: It is the property or a constraint of a business asset that is supposed to be 
assured for the smooth flow of the transaction.  Mainly security criterion describes the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system. 
Security Requirement: It is a countermeasure that is to be implemented to mitigate potential 
attacks to the system. 
 
2.3.2 Risk related concepts: It defines the concept and exposure of harmfulness to assets.  
Risk: Defines the possibility of harmfulness. It is consisted of the following elements, when 
combined together creates a negative consequences to the system and business.  
Impact: Negative consequences of a risk that may harm assets of an organization when a 
threat is successful which eventually negates the security criterion and result in a loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the resources.  
Event: A set of actions that combine threat and vulnerability to harm the system or 
organization.  
Vulnerability: It is a weakness or a flaw in a system that can be exploited by a hacker to harm 
assets in terms of IS security.  
Threat: Intention to inflict an attack mainly to harm the IS and business Asset. The threat is 
carried out by a threat agent and attack method.  
Threat Agent: An agent that produces a threat to harm the IS asset and is mainly a source of 
risk to the IS. Example: A hacker, an insider (employee of the organization)  
Attack Method: A technique through which a threat agent produces a threat. Example: 
Exploiting an online message sending vulnerability to steal information. 
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2.3.3 Risk treatment related concepts: It defines the countermeasure to evade the risk and 
provides the security requirements and controls to mitigate the potential risks.  
Risk treatment: Defines a way to deal with the identified risks that satisfies the security need 
of the IS and can be considered as a security requirement. The risk treatment includes but may 
not be limited to; avoiding the risk, reducing the risk, transferring the risk and retaining the 
risk. 
Security Requirement: Security requirement is the countermeasure to mitigate the potential 
risk to the IS. Example: Encryption of the data mitigates the risk of stealing data. 
Control: Counter attack to minimize the security risk, it defines the processes, policies and 
other practices to protect the security of the IS. Example: Firewall, Secure internet 
Connections, backup procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 ISSRM Domain Model (taken from Mayer 2009 [18]) 
2.6 ISSRM Process 
ISSRM process is a security requirement engineering process based on the risk analysis 
methodology and is consist of the following steps [18]. It is shown in Fig 2.2. 
 
(i) Context and Asset Identification: The process start by identifying the assets including IS 
assets and business assets in an organization’s context and environment focusing on 
information security.  
 
(ii) Determination of Security Objectives: In this step, security objectives are identified based 
on the asset identification and its security. Security objectives are often characterized in terms 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability.  
 
(iii) Risk Analysis and Assessment: In this step the examination and estimation of the risk is 
performed. If the examination and assessment of the risks are done against the security risks, 
the process will continue to the next step, otherwise the process will go back to the previous 
step.  
 
(vi) Risk Treatment: Risk treatment is processed in four different ways:  
(1)Risk avoidance suggests not taking any decision of getting involved in any risk situation. 
(2)Risk Reduction suggests in taking some actions that lessens the probability of any impact 
associated with the risk. (3)Risk Transfer suggest to transfer the risk to any other party (4) 
Risk retention, the loss from the risk is accepted and hence no security measures are required.  
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(v) Security Requirements Definition: Security Requirements are dependent on the decision 
taken in step 4. Security requirements are the countermeasure to mitigate the risk and its 
consequences. Some security requirements decisions have to be taken. Once the security 
requirements are finalized, they must be verified for the security they provide; otherwise the 
risk treatment process should be revised again for proper protection.  
 
(iv) Control Selection and Implementation: The process of improving the security of the 
system by setting some security policies and countermeasures and their implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 ISSRM Process (taken from Mayer, 2009 [18]) 
2.7 Summary 
The demand for security of IS is constantly growing and it is the most essential thing that 
needs to be catered during the early development process. Security breaches in IS can lead to 
the negative consequences. Considering the security at early stages assists to analyse and 
estimate security measures of the IS to be developed. Security risk management has evolved 
from time to time and different security standards have been adopted but many of the state of 
the art methodologies and standards ignore the importance of managing the risk at 
requirement elicitation phase. ISSRM domain model is a framework which addresses the most 
important points for handling the security related issues in an information system domain.  
The objective of ISSRM is to extend modelling languages with ISSRM concept alignment to 
analyze requirements at the early stage of the development. The focus of ISSRM reference 
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model is to secure the information system. ISSRM process is a security requirement 
engineering process based on the risk analysis methodology. As discussed in this chapter, we 
have come up with different terminologies like asset, risk, threat and vulnerabilities that are 
used in the domain of security risk management. Following are the reasons behind our 
decisions: It has already been used for concept alignment at requirement engineering. 
- It defines and covers the security risk management concepts at three different 
conceptual levels and satisfies the security needs of an organisation. 
- It allows the alignment of security modelling languages and has already been used 
for this purpose. 
- The focus is to secure the information system. 
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Chapter 3  
Modelling Languages 
 
This chapter introduces the modelling languages with their construct and examples for 
security risk management. The languages include BPMN, Secure Tropos, Mal-Activity and 
misuse cases. 
3.1 BPMN 
3.1.1 Purpose  
Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) is used to represent business processes 
graphically, their execution, analysis and monitoring [29]. It is used widely now days for 
information system management of the business processes. The business processes involves 
human interaction, software and information communication and physical artefacts. The 
business process includes events, activities and decisions that are logically related to each 
other. 
3.1.2 Construct and Example  
A process in BPMN is called a business process diagram and is consist of the four major 
categories of construct. It includes events, activities, gateways and connections, objects and 
artefacts. The Events represented by a circle are the starting and ending points of a process, 
they can be triggered with different messages, timers or signals to indicate a particular event. 
Gateways indicate a control flow of the activities and events based on the condition and are 
represented by a diamond shape. The task or activities are an atomic unit that represents a 
single unit of work, the multiple similar tasks are merged as a subtask or compound unit of 
work. Swim lanes is a way of categorizing tasks and usually contains pools and lanes. 
A Pool is a representation of participants or resources in a BPMN Process and show 
the message flow between processes and participants and a Lane categorizes the flow of 
events and an organization unit. Sequence flow connects the gateways, events and activities to 
be performed. Message Flow shows the flow of messages across two or more pools, typically 
the flow of inputs or outputs from one pool to another and vice versa. Association links flow 
objects to artefacts and/or annotation. The BPMN artefacts are the data objects which show 
that what data is required by activities, data stores represents a way to store data and 
annotations is a way to attach additional information with objects. In Fig 3.1, we show an 
example of BPMN with its legends. 
3.1.3 Relationship to ISSRM 
The example in Fig. 3.1 has applied the construct of BPMN considering the attack scenario 
and providing the countermeasures in reference to ISSRM domain model. Asset Related 
concepts include valuable business assets like processes and information and can be observed 
in a BPMN construct, such as task, gateway, event and their connecting points. Risk-related 
concepts, In BPMN, there is no concrete way to model the security risk, however the pool 
represents the negative participant and can be characterized as a threat agent in BPMN 
construct and any task or an activity performed by threat agent is considered to be an attack 
method and same argumentation is applied to flow and data association flow. Risk treatment-
related concepts deals with the actions to be taken and the decisions regarding implementation 
of the control to mitigate the risks. The approach of risk reduction, risk transfer, risk 
avoidance and risk acceptance can be applied to treat the risk depending on the mitigation of 
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the risk, in our example we have selected the risk reduction (i.e. risk treatment decision to 
mitigate the risk). 
 
Fig. 3.1. BPMN Risk Management 
3.2 Secure Tropos 
3.2.1 Purpose  
Secure Tropos is based on the core concept of Tropos. It is a security oriented extension of 
Tropos methodology which is used at early requirement analysis and later on defines the 
architectural and design level concepts [6, 20, 21]. 
3.2.2 Construct and Example  
Secure Tropos has been extended from i* modelling framework which consist of actors, goals, 
tasks, resources and social dependencies. Likewise, Secure Tropos are also consists of actor (An 
entity having strategic benefits and goals within the system), goal (represents actor’s intentions 
within the system), soft goals (represents non-functional requirements), resource (Physical or 
Informational entity) and plan (represents a task or an activity). Security constraint (A restriction 
related to security of the system) and threat for modelling the security related concepts. The 
concrete elements of Secure Tropos are linked together with the relationship of depender and 
dependee. The legend of secure tropos and an example is shown in the Fig 3.3. 
3.2.3 Relationship to ISSRM 
The example in figure 3.3 has applied the construct of secure Tropos considering the attack 
scenario and providing the countermeasures in reference to ISSRM. Asset-Related concepts, 
in secure tropos, actor, goal, softgoal, plan and resourceare used to identify the business asset 
and IS Asset and security constraint andsoftgoalas security criterion. Risk-Related concepts 
represents the potential risk and the construct in secure tropos are; impact represented by 
contribution between the threat and softgoal where threat is a goal, plan, threat agent is an 
attacker and vulnerability as belief and attack method is a plan and relationship attacks. Risk-
Treatment related conceptsrepresented through security criterion in secure Tropos with the 
construct of actor, goal, softgoal, plan, resource security constraint. 
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Fig. 3.2 Modelling with Secure Tropos  
3.3 Mal-Activity 
3.3.1 Purpose 
The idea behind the Mal(icious)-activity is same as of standard UML activity diagrams but 
with the intentions of capturing the negative scenario at the early phase of RE and modelling 
of the system [7, 8]. It uses the same semantics and syntax of activity diagrams to draw the 
Mal-activity diagrams but only with a little change to capture the negative scenario. Mal-
activity abbreviated as MAD describes the procedural logic, business process and work flow. 
3.3.2 Construct and Example 
Mal-Activity uses the same construct as of activity diagrams but the exception of construct 
that capture the negative scenario like Mal-activity, Mal-swimlane, and Mal-decision as show 
in a figure 3.3 along with other MAD constructs. All of the concrete elements of the MAD are 
connected with the control flow arrow. Activity describes an atomic unit of task and Mal-
Activity describes the negative task performed by a hostile user. Initial state is the starting 
point of the activity whereas the final state is the ending point of an activity. The example of 
MAD is shown in figure 3.4 which shows the sequence of actions to update user’s personal 
information while the hacker is intending to steal the user credentials from the user. 
3.3.3    Relationship to ISSRM 
The example in fig. 3.4 has applied the construct of MAL-Activity diagram considering the 
attack scenario and providing the countermeasures in reference to ISSRM. Asset-Related 
concepts, in MAD, activity, decision, control flow are used to identify the business asset and 
swimlane and activity, decision as IS Asset. Risk-Related concepts represents the potential risk 
and the construct in secure tropos are: impact as Mal-Activity, threat agent as Mal-
Swimlaneand attack method as Mal-Activity, Mal-Decision, control flow and Mal-Swimlane. 
Risk-Treatment related concepts define the security countermeasures and mitigation-activity 
is used as a security requirement for MAD.  
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    Fig. 3.3. MAL-Activity diagram and Legends 
3.4 Misuse Cases 
3.4.1 Purpose  
Based on UML definition of use cases, Misuse cases are also defined as a sequence of actions 
required for the interaction between the Misuse case and a Misuser to achieve a certain goal in 
an undesired way [3, 17, 26]. Misuse Case is a list or sequence of steps, if performed by an 
agent successfully, cause harm to the stakeholder and/or to a system. A Misuser is an actor 
that is willing to use the system with unfavourable intents, deliberately or not deliberately. 
3.4.2    Construct and Example 
Graphical Notation describes the high level view of the systems functionality. Misuse case 
extends the use case notation to describe the security requirements of the system to be 
developed. The Fig 3.4 and Fig. 3.5 shows a basic example of use cases and misuse cases 
diagrams. The diagram uses the relationships of use cases including includes and extends, and 
it introduces the relationships mitigates, threaten and exploits to the model. The diagram also 
uses the use cases as misuse case in dark shadowy use cases. An actor plays a role of 
interacting with the system. An actor can be initiator or participant. A use case is a list of 
actions to be performed by an actor to achieve certain goals. The relationship includes and 
extends define that a use case can include or extend one or more use cases to itself. A misuse 
case is a list of hostile actions when completed successfully by misuser cause harm to the 
system assets or stockholder. A misuser is an actor or an agent who initiates a threat to the 
system deliberately or inadvertently. It can be an attacker or hacker. The threaten relationship 
indicates that a misuse case want to harm a use case whereas a mitigates relationship provides 
a countermeasure by means of a security use case to the use case. 
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Table 3.2 Construct of Misuse Cases 
    Misuse Case   Graphical Notation 
    Actor 
                   
    Use Case 
 
    Threat 
 
    Misuser 
 
    Security Requirement 
 
    Extends ,Includes  <<extends>>  ,                  <<includes>> 
    Threatens, Exploits and Mitigates  <<threatens>>     ,      <<exploits>> 
 
                     <<mitigates>> 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.4 Assets Modelling 
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Fig. 3.5 Threat Modelling 
3.4.4    Misuse cases and ISSRM 
The existing alignment of misuse cases is not entirely aligned with ISSRM domain model but 
rather it present the correspondence, overlap or similarity of concepts between the Misuse 
cases and ISSRM domain model as shown in the Table. 3.1. Misuse case constructs are given 
in the Misuse case diagram column conforming to ISSRM domain model. Synonyms column 
defines the similar meanings found in the literature and ISSRM Domain model column 
defines the elements of ISSRM domain model. Assets in ISSRM domain model corresponds 
to Actor and Use cases in the graphical notation which also represent IS Assets and Business 
Assets. Risk (Threat) is represented as a misuser and misuse case where misuser is a threat 
agent and misuse case is an attack method. Risk Treatment only defines the security 
requirement by means of use case in misuse case diagrams. Rows with a “-” are not yet 
aligned with the concept of ISSRM reference model. 
Table 3.1 Alignment of Misuse cases with ISSRM (Taken from [17]) 
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3.4.5 Textual Template for Misuse Cases 
A misuse case diagram only gives a high level view of the functionality and security threats of 
the system to be developed, on the other hand, like use cases, the use of textual template can 
be very useful as it provides the detailed information about the functionality and security 
threats of the system by providing the description of the steps of sequence to be performed 
[26]. They are documented in a misuse case template. Misuse cases can be expressed in two 
different textual descriptions. Lightweight description and extensive description, these two 
descriptions are out of the scope of this research work. 
3.4.6 Summary 
In this chapter we introduced different modelling languages including BPMN, Secure Tropos, 
Mal-Activity and MUC. Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) is used to represent 
business processes graphically, their execution, analysis and monitoring [29]. It is used widely 
now days for information system management of the business processes. Secure Tropos is 
based on the core concept of Tropos. It is a security oriented extension of Tropos 
methodology which is used at early requirement analysis and later on defines the architectural 
and design level concepts [6]. The idea behind the Mal-activity is same as of standard UML 
activity diagrams but with the intentions of capturing the negative scenario at the early phase 
of RE and modelling of the system [7, 8]. MUC is based on UML definition of use cases, 
Misuse cases are also defined as a sequence of actions required for the interaction between the 
Misuse case and a Misuser to achieve a certain goal in an undesired way [3, 17]. We provide a 
simple introduction to the languages, its relation to ISSRM and the example of each language. 
We also introduced existing misuse cases and its relation to ISSRM along with the example.    
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CHAPTER 4  
Alignment of Misuse Cases to ISSRM 
 
The main objective of aligning misuse cases with ISSRM is to evaluate and assess the 
capability of misuse case for security risk management in reference to ISSRM. Also it will 
help firstly, in understanding security concerns at the earlier stages of the development. 
Secondly, to view security problems from different angles, understanding different security 
development perspectives. 
4.1 Research Method 
To align Misuse cases with ISSRM domain model, we applied the research method shown in 
Fig. 4.1. The main research objective of this study is to enable misuse cases in order to 
support the security risk management in IS development. Our research method is as 3-step 
process: firstly, we conducted literature review of security in information systems and the 
ISSRM domain model to identify the security risk concepts. Secondly, we investigated how 
existing misuse case diagrams model the security risk concepts. Here, we observed the 
limitation of misuse case diagrams in modelling the ISSRM concepts and executing the risk 
management processes. Lastly, we introduce extensions to the misuse case diagrams i.e. 
SROMUC. They include the extended meta-model of Misuse case diagrams with new 
constructs to address ISSRM concepts. The new meta-model provides concrete syntax and 
semantics to represent asset, risk and risk-treatment models using Misuse case diagrams. This 
work is a part of the larger effort to align several modelling languages to the ISSRM model, 
define their semantics at full extend and develop a systematic model transformation based 
security risk-driven method for secure system development. 
 
Fig. 4.1 Research Method 
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4.2 Misuse Case Running Example 
4.2.1 Scenario 1: SROMUC Modelling for Integrity 
This research applies modelling with SROMUC for an online banking IS [1, 31] and 
illustrates the usage of SROMUC. We split the example in asset model (see Fig. 4.2), threat 
model (see Fig. 4.3), and security requirement model (see Fig.4.4). 
  
4.2.1.1 Asset model. In Fig.4.2, we present the context of an online banking IS modelled in a 
use case diagram along with the security criterion. A security criterion (see Fig. 2) is a 
security property imposed on business use case (i.e., business asset). The example focuses on 
the bank customer and bank officer who communicate with Banking IS. The Bank Customer 
and Bank Officer are the assets characterizing the users of the system in reference to ISSRM 
domain model. The bank customer seeks to Perform Transaction and bank officer seeks to 
Keep Account Data Up To Date. The Perform Transaction includes two use cases Pay Money 
and Keep Account Data Up To Date and extends Perform Transaction Via Online. Perform 
Transaction has a security criterion Integrity of Transaction represented as a hexagon (see 
Fig. 2) as it characterizes a security constraint of a business use case (i.e., Perform 
Transaction). In Fig. 2, a dotted line with stereo type constraints of is linked from business 
use case (i.e., Perform Transaction) to security criterion (i.e., Integrity of Transaction) shows 
the relationship between the two. According to ISSRM domain model we identified Perform 
Transaction as a business asset that has some business value and Perform Transaction Via 
Online support the business asset and is considered as an IS asset. 
 
4.2.1.2 Risk model.  In Fig. 4.3, we presents potential threat scenario modelled in SROMUC 
diagram. Misuser (i.e., Attacker) initiates a misuse case (i.e., Intercept Money includes 
Transfer money to another account and Change details of transaction) by exploiting the 
vulnerability (i.e., Unsecure Network Channel) in a use case (i.e., IS asset).  In Fig. 3, the 
vulnerability is represented by filled grey use case. The misuse case Intercept Payment 
threatens the use case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS Asset). The threat Intercept 
Money leads to an impact (i.e., Money Transferred to Unintended Account) which harms the 
business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction) and disaffirms the security criterion (i.e., 
Integrity of Transaction). The impact is a state of system that is represented as rounded 
rectangle (see Fig. 3). Misuse case is linked to impact using leads to relationship. On one 
hand, impact disaffirms the security criterion linked with negates relationship. On another 
hand impact harms the business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction).  
 
Fig.4.2 Asset Modelling 
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Fig.4.3. Threat Modelling 
4.2.1.3 Risk treatment model. ISSRM domain model supports the risk treatment, control and 
its implementation. However, SROMUC does not support the modelling of these concepts but 
security requirement is modelled as a security use case. Security use case is represented as a 
use case with a lock inside (see Fig. 4.4). In Fig. 4, we present the security requirement for 
identified threats in our example. The use case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS 
Asset) includes a security use case (i.e., Apply Cryptographic Procedures and Use Secure 
Communication Protocol). The security use case mitigates the misuse case (i.e., Intercept 
Money). It ensures security criterion (i.e., Integrity of Payment) imposed by business use case 
(i.e., Perform Transaction). 
 
Fig.4.4. Security Requirement Modelling 
4.2.1.2 Scenario 2: SROMUC Modelling for Availability 
In Fig. 4.5, we model an online banking IS [1, 31] for Availability of Service. In our example, 
the business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction) has a constraint of security criterion (i.e., 
Availability Of Online Service). The misuser (i.e., Attacker) initiates a misuse case (i.e., 
Make Online Service Unavailable includes Initiate Half Opened Connections To Server). It 
exploits the vulnerability (i.e., Allow Unlimited Number Of Connections) included in a use 
case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS Asset). The misuse case Make Online Service 
Unavailable threatens use case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS asset) and leads to an 
impact (i.e., Availability Of Service Is Compromised), moreover, it harms the business use 
case Perform Transaction. The impact of the misuse case negates the security criterion. 
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4.2.1.3 Scenario 3: SROMUC Modelling for Confidentiality 
In Fig. 4.6, we model the example of an online banking IS [1, 31] for the Confidentiality Of 
Data. In this example, the business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction) has a constraint of 
security criterion (i.e., Confidentiality Of Transaction). The use case Perform Transaction Via 
Online (i.e., IS asset) includes another use case (i.e., Ensure Account privacy includes Enter 
PIN Code) for securing an online transaction. The misuser (i.e., Attacker) initiates a misuse 
case (i.e., Steal Account Data includes Retrieve Transaction Data includes Disclose 
Transaction Data) by exploiting the vulnerability (i.e., Data Is Not Encrypted and Accept 
Malicious Data). The misuse case (i.e., Steal Account Data) threatens the use case Perform 
Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS asset) and leads to an impact (i.e., Confidentiality Of Data Is 
Compromised), moreover, It also harms the business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction). The 
impact of the misuse case negates the security criterion. 
 
Fig.4.5. Modelling for Availability of Service 
 
Fig. 4.6. Modelling for Confidentiality of Data 
4.3 Concept Alignment of SROMUC and ISSRM 
The existing alignment of misuse cases is not entirely aligned with ISSRM domain model but 
rather it presents the correspondence, overlap or similarity [2, 16]. In this section we describe 
the alignment of SROMUC with the concepts found in ISSRM domain model. In Table 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3, first column defines the concepts of ISSRM domain model. Second column 
defines the synonyms found in the literature. Third column differentiates the concepts and 
relationship. The last column defines the visual construct for SROMUC. 
 
4.3.1 Alignment of asset related concepts. In Table 4.1, we introduce SROMUC syntax to 
represent the ISSRM asset related concepts. Assets in ISSRM domain model corresponds to 
Actor and Use case in SROMUC. The business asset and the IS assets are modelled as a use 
case. The supports relationship in ISSRM between IS asset and business assets is expressed 
using extends and includes relationship. We introduce hexagon construct in SROMUC to 
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represent the security criterion from ISSRM. According to ISSRM security criterion is 
constraint of business asset therefore the hexagon is linked to business use case through 
dotted line with constraint of relationship.  
 
4.3.2 Alignment of risk-related concepts. In Table 4.2, we introduce SROMUC syntax to 
represent the ISSRM risk-related concepts. Misuser is represented as a Threat Agent, Attack 
Method as Misuse Case and Vulnerability as a filled grey use case in SROMUC. The Threat 
is modelled as a combination of a misuser and misuse case (i.e., Misuser communicates with 
Misuse Case). The targets relationship in ISSRM domain model is represented as a threatens 
relationship in SROMUC. We used a rounded rectangle to model the impact concept of 
ISSRM. 
In order to be compliant with ISSRM domain model, we also introduce the exploits, 
leads to, harms and negates relationships. Exploits relationship defines a link between misuse 
case and the vulnerability whereas leads to relationship defines a link between the misuse 
case and the impact. The harms relationship defines the link between an impact and a 
business use case whereas a negates relationship defines a link between an impact and the 
security criterion (see Table 4.2). We combine the concepts of threat agent, attack method, 
vulnerability, and impact all together to represent an event, where a risk is understood as a 
combination of event and the impact.  
 
4.3.3 Alignment of risk treatment related concepts. In risk treatment related concepts, we 
update the visual syntax of security use case by adding a padlock to security use case which 
represents security requirement (see Table 4.3) in ISSRM. The Mitigates relationship of 
ISSRM is modelled with mitigates relationship from security use cases (i.e., security 
requirement) to misuse case in SROMUC. 
Table 4.4. Asset Related Concepts (C – Concept, R – Relationships) 
ISSRM 
Concepts 
Synonyms Type SROMUC Syntax 
Assets - C 
 
Business Asset Business Use Case C 
 
IS Asset IS Use Case C 
 
Security Criterion Security Constraint C 
 
Supports - R   <<extends>>  ,              <<includes>> 
Constraints of Restriction R                   <<constraints of>> 
4.4 Abstract Syntax of Security Risk-oriented Misuse Cases 
We presented the SROMUC before abstract syntax due to the simple introduction of the 
language. However, to illustrate the application of proposed SROMUC, we need to present 
the abstract syntax.  In Fig. 4.7, the Meta model presents an abstract syntax of SROMUC. The 
major elements in the Meta model are an Actor OR Misuser and Use OR Misuse Case. Actor 
OR Misuser initiates the communication to interact with Use OR Misuse Case. Their 
cardinality shows that an Actor or Misuser can communicate with one or more Use or 
Misuser Case. Actor and misuser are the specialization of an Actor OR Misuser. Use Or 
Misuse case can includes or extends another Use OR Misuse Case. The Use Case, 
Vulnerability and Misuse Case are the specialization of Use OR Misuse Case. The Use Case 
includes one or more Vulnerabilities that can be exploited by one or more misuse cases. A 
Misuse Case threatens (i.e., threatening) one or more use cases. A Misuse Case Leads To one 
 32 
 
or more Impact. An Impact will have Harms on one or more use cases by negating one or 
more Security Criterion defined as Constraint Of that use case. A Security Use Case is a 
specialized Use Case. One or more Security Use Case Mitigates one or more misuse Cases.   
Table 4.5. Alignment of Risk related Concepts(C – Concepts, R – Relationships) 
ISSRM Concepts Synonym
s 
Type SROMUC Syntax 
Risk Hazard C 
 
Impact Effect C 
 
Event Incident C 
 
Attack Method Violence C 
 
Vulnerability Weakness C 
 
Threat Agent Attacker C 
 
Threat Hazard C 
 
Exploits - R                            <<exploits>> 
Negates Denies,  R                            <<negates>> 
Harms             - R                              <<harms>> 
Leads to - R                            <<leads to>> 
Characteristics of - R    <<includes>>                        <<extends>> 
Uses - R  
 
Table 4.6. Risk Treatment related Concepts (C – Concepts, R – Relationships) 
ISSRM Concepts Synonyms Type SROMUC Syntax 
Risk Treatment  C  
Security Requirement Countermeasure C 
 
Control  C - 
Refines  R - 
Mitigates Diminishes R         <<mitigates>> 
Implements   - 
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Fig. 4.7. Meta Model of SROMUC 
 4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have analysed how Misuse Cases can be used to manage security risks at 
the early stages of the IS development. The main objective of aligning misuse cases with 
ISSRM is to evaluate and assess the capability of misuse case for security risk management in 
reference to ISSRM in understanding security concerns at the earlier stages of the 
development. we applied the research method shown in Fig. 4.1, we study the literature 
regarding security in information system and investigated how existing misuse case diagrams 
model the security risk concepts, we introduce extensions to the misuse case diagrams and 
introduces SROMUC and applied it on an online banking IS for Integrity, confidentiality and 
availability of service. We developed three scenarios to illustrate these concepts. we presented 
the alignment of SROMUC with the concepts of ISSRM domain model. Table 4.1, 4.2 and 
4.3, gives a high level overview of the alignment. In the end, the abstract syntax of SROMUC 
was given which describe the application of SROMUC.     
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CHAPTER 5  
Model Transformations  
 
This chapter introduces a set of rules for translating SROMUC to Secure Tropos model. They 
are based on ISSRM domain model and its application process and the alignment of both the 
languages to ISSRM. We will apply the incremental model to transform the SROMUC to 
secure tropos rule by rule.  To apply the transformation rules we will use the example 
presented in Fig. 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 of scenario 1 – SROMUC modelling for Integrity of Section 
4.2.1. The transformation presented here are the extension, correspondence and/or over lap of 
the transformation given by Naved et al [1, 2]. 
5.1 Transformation Rules from Misuse cases to Secure Tropos 
TRMS 1: A system boundary in SROMUC is translated to a system actor and its boundary 
in secure tropos. This rule is based on alignment between the Secure Tropos actor and misuse 
case system boundary to the ISSRM IS asset. After applying TRMS 1, we will get the 
following model as shown in Fig. 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1. System Actor 
TRMS 2. A use case in SROMUC is translated to a goal or a plan in secure tropos.  
Similarly, an includes or extends relationship is translated to a means-end where ends is 
the goal and means is the plan and decomposition link where some plan is decomposed. 
Here the developer decides whether a use case is translated to Secure Tropos goal or a plan. In 
Fig. xx, we translated the use case Perform Transaction to a goal meaning that the use case 
Perform Transaction Via Online should be a plan because only a plan could be means to 
achieve the goal (ends) in Secure Tropos. Here, we also define two plans Keep Account Data 
Up To Date and Pay Money to achieve the goal as shown in Fig. 5.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2. Goal and Plan 
 
Banking    
     IS 
Banking   
     IS 
Perform Transaction 
Perform 
Transaction     
Via Online 
Keep Account 
Data up to Date 
Pay Money 
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TRMS 3. A security constraint in SROMUC is translated to a security constraint in secure 
tropos, moreover, a constraints of relationship is translated to restricts link in secure tropos. 
This rule represents the security criterion and constraints of element respectively in reference 
to ISSRM domain model as shown in Fig. 5.3. 
 
Fig. 5.3. Security Criterion 
TRMS 4. An actor in SROMUC is translated to an actor in Secure tropos. Moreover, a 
communication relationship is translated to a dependency link in secure tropos. 
In SROMUC, an actor collaborate with the system through a communication link while in 
secure tropos dependency link is used. In secure tropos, dependency link a depender, 
dependee and dependum as described here:  
- If the system is depender, the communication link is translated as dependee and 
the developer has to specify the dependum.  
- If the system is dependee, then communication link is translated as a depender and 
the use case ( goal of the actor) becomes the dependum in secure tropos 
dependency.  
- The security constraint on dependency links depends on the developers choice to 
set them manually as SROMUC does not support such thing. After applying 
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TRMS 4, we will get the model as shown in Fig. 5.4.
 
Fig. 5.4. Actor 
TRMS 5: A misuser in SROMUC is translated to a threat agent (attacker) in secure tropos. 
Similarly, a misuse case is translated to a plan of a threat agent in secure tropos. They are 
linked through a communication relationship in SROMUC and means-end or 
decomposition link in secure tropos. It is based on the alignment of SROMUC and Secure 
tropos which identifies that the misuser and the Secure Tropos actor are aligned to the ISSRM 
threat agent. Thus in Fig. 5.5, we identify a threat agent as attacker. 
 
Fig. 5.5. Attacker 
TRMS 6. Vulnerability in SROMUC is translated to a vulnerability point in secure tropos. 
Moreover, threatens and exploits relationship are translated to attacks and exploits link in 
secure tropos respectively. Vulnerability is SROMUC is represented as a use case and it 
define the specific weakness in the system as a use case, but in secure tropos it is just 
represented with a black circle over a vulnerable asset, hence the developer has to apply the 
rule accordingly during the transformation. After applying TRMS 6, we will get the model as 
shown in Fig. 5.6. 
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Fig. 5.6. Attacks and exploits 
TRMS 7 : Impact in SROMUC is translated to a combination of threat, impacts link and 
the plan. Moreover, from SROMUC, Negates, Harms and leads to relationship are 
translated to impacts relationship. In SROMUC, impact has a a concrete syntax, represented 
as a rounded rectangle where as in secure tropose, it is abstract meaning that developer has to 
identify the impact through the combination of impacts link and threat. 
TRMS 8: A security use case is translated to a security plan or goal in secure tropos. 
Similarly, a mitigates relationship is translated to a mitigates link in secure tropos. We have 
translated the security use case Apply Cryptographic Procedures to a Plan as show in Fig. 5.7. 
 
Fig. 5.7. Attacks, exploits and impact 
5.2 Transformation from Secure tropos to Misuse Cases 
This section defines a set of transformation rules from the Secure Tropos model to the 
SROMUC diagram. The transformation rules, presented in this section are based on the 
alignment between the ISSRM domain model. We will transform a meeting scheduler, a well-
established exemplar in RE as shown in Fig.5.8, Fig. 5.9, and Fig. 5.10. It was also used in 
[2]. Again we apply the incremental model to transform the secure tropos model to 
SROMUC. 
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Fig. 5.8. Asset Model (Taken from [2]) 
 
 
Fig. 5.9. Threat Model (Taken from [2]) 
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Fig. 5.10. Security Model (Taken from [2]) 
TRSM 1: A system actor and its boundary in secure tropos is translated to a system 
boundary in SROMUC. This rule is based on alignment between the Secure Tropos actor and 
SROMUC system boundary to the ISSRM domain model. After applying TRSM 1, we will 
get the following model as shown in Fig. 5.11. 
 
 
Fig. 5.11. System Boundary 
TRSM 2. A goal or a plan in secure tropos is translated to a use case in SROMUC. 
Similarly, a means-end where ends is the goal and means is the plan and decomposition 
link where some plan is decomposed is translated to an includes or extends relationship. 
After aplying this rule, we will get the model as shown in Fig. 5.12 
 
Fig. 5.12. Use cases 
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TRSM 3. A security constraint in secure tropos is translated to a security constraint in 
SROMUC, moreover, a restricts link is translated to constraints of relationship in 
SROMUC. This rule represents the security criterion and constraints of element respectively 
in reference to ISSRM domain model as shown in Fig. 5.13. 
 
Fig. 5.13. Use cases and Security criterion 
TRSM 4. An actor in secure tropos is translated to an actor in SROMUC. Moreover, a 
dependency link in secure tropos is translated to a communication relationship. 
In secure tropos, dependency link is used for collaboration with the system. In secure tropos, 
dependency link a depender, dependee and dependum while in SROMUC, it is a 
straightforward and is translated to a communication relationship. A developer must exclude 
extra dependencies. After applying the TRSM 4, we will get the model as shown in Fig. 5.14. 
 
 Fig. 5.14. Actor and Use cases  
TRSM 5: A threat agent (attacker) in secure tropos is translated to a misuser in SROMUC. 
Similarly, a plan of a threat agent in secure tropos is translated to a misuse case in 
SROMUC. They are linked through a means-end or decomposition link in secure tropos and a 
communication relationship in SROMUC. It is based on the alignment of SROMUC and 
Secure tropos which identifies that the misuser and the secure tropos actor are aligned to the 
ISSRM threat agent as show in Fig. 5.15. 
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Fig. 5.15. Misuser and Misuse Cases 
TRSM 6. Vulnerability point in secure tropos is translated to vulnerability in SROMUC. 
Moreover, attacks and exploits links are translated to a threatens and exploits relationship 
in SROMUC respectively. Vulnerability point is secure tropos is represented as a black circle 
over a plan but in SROMUC it define the specific weakness in the system as a use case, hence 
the developer has to apply the rule accordingly during the transformation. After applying 
TRMS 6, we will get the model as shown in Fig. 5.16. 
 
Fig. 5.16. Vulnerability 
TRSM 7 : A combination of threat, impacts link and the plan is translated to an impact in 
SROMUC. Moreover,impacts relationship in secure tropos is translated to a  negates, 
harms and leads to relationship in SROMUC. In SROMUC, impact has a a concrete syntax, 
represented as a rounded rectangle where as in secure tropose, it is abstract meaning that 
developer has to identify the impact through the combination of impacts link and threat as 
shown in Fig. 5.17. 
 
Fig. 5.17. Impact 
TRMS 8: A security plan or goal is translated to a security use case in SRUMUC. Similarly, a 
mitigates link is translated to a mitigates relationship in secure tropos. We have translated the 
security plan Apply Cryptographic Procedures to a security use case as show in Fig 5.18. 
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Fig. 5.18. Security Use Case 
5.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we tried to eliminate the gap between secure tropos and SROMUC by 
providing the translation between the two languages. We develop the transformation rules 
from secure tropos to SROMUC and from SROMUC to secure tropos. We applied the 
incremental model to apply the rules from one language to another. The translated models 
provide the information for tackling the security risk management from different perspective. 
The translation can be applied to existing system and to the new systems in IS development 
process.  
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Chapter 6  
Comprehensibility of SROMUC 
 
In this chapter, we examine and measure the comprehensibility of SROMUC. Firstly, we 
define the approach to measure the comprehensibility of SROMUC and what we expect to 
receive as the results. Secondly, we ask the practitioners to answer a questionnaire (see 
appendix A) in order to measure the comprehensibility of SROMUC. Finally, we report how 
we carried out the study and summarize the results.  
6.1 Participant Selection 
In order to measure the comprehensibility of SROMUC, we contacted 50 software/IS 
practitioners including software analysts, business analysts, software engineers and architects. 
The participants were selected from different companies from all over the world in order to 
confirm how the different roles perceive SROMUC. All the participant were working in IS 
development industries which resulted in getting different evaluation.  
6.2 Survey for Measuring Comprehensibility of SROMUC 
We prepared a questionnaire (see appendix A) addressing the comprehensibility of the 
SROMUC and gathered responses from the participants. This provided us a closer feedback 
and allowed us to ask additional information when the answers were vague or shallow.  
Firstly, we briefly introduced the concept of ISSRM and SROMUC and their 
alignment to the participants; we introduced the construct of SROMUC in reference to 
ISSRM domain model. Then we explained the concept by modelling the diagram using 
SROMUC for online banking IS. The survey results were analyzed based on correctly 
identifying the SROMUC construct and the concept defined in ISSRM domain model. After 
the survey, we categorized the participants into business analysts, software analysts and 
architects and software developers and requested them to answer the short questions. We were 
interested in the following aspects  
- How comprehensible and easy the SROMUC is. 
- How much satisfied are you with the alignment of SROMUC to ISSRM domain 
model. 
- Does it help to measure the security risk using SROMUC. 
6.3 Results 
Each of the participants was asked to give the feedback for the comprehensibility of 
SROMUC by identifying the construct of SROMUC in terms of concepts defined in ISSRM 
domain model. Table 6.1 presents the questions from questionnaire and summarizes the 
survey results. We present the questions in column one, column two represents the total 
number of participant while column three represent the number of participants who responded 
to questions. Column four represents the total number of satisfied answers for each question 
and column five presents the total number of unsatisfied answers for each question. Last 
column provide the percentage of satisfied answers for each question. To calculate the 
percentage, we used  
(total number of participants responded / total number of satisfied answers ) * 100 
For the comprehensibility, satisfaction and easiness of SROMUC, we requested the 
practitioners to rate the questions given in Table 6.2 based on the scale from 1 (lowest) to 5 
(highest). We categorised the practitioners  into business analyst, software analyst, software 
security analysts and software developers in order to perceive the results from different 
perspective.  The results are shown in Table 6.2. In Table 6.2, column one represent the 
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questions, column two, three, four and five represents the answers from business analysts, 
software analyst, software security analysts and software developers respectively. The results 
presented are the average results given by each group of participants. For example, we asked 
10 business analyst to rate all the questions presented in column one of Table 6.2, 08 of the 
rate the question1 4 or above and question 2 and 3 as 3 or above.  
How comprehensible and easy SROMUC is? All the participants consider the 
SROMUC comprehensible and easy to learn. People understood the application of ISSRM 
and SROMUC. They implied that the construct are vivid and easy to remember.  
How satisfied are you with the alignment of SROMUC to ISSRM? This question turned 
out to be the hardest to answer. The participants had never used ISSRM for security risk 
management; it was new experience for them. While the participants did not say that they are 
satisfied or not with the alignment but they were also reluctant to confirm that it met their 
expectations.  
Does it help to measure the security risk using SROMUC? All respondents understood 
clearly the benefits of the SROMUC – A security risk management using a modelling 
language. Majority of the participants agreed that the security risk management is rather easy 
to understand using SROMUC. 
Table 6.1 Survey Results 
Questions Total No. 
Of 
Participants 
Total No of 
Participants 
Responded 
Total No. 
of Satisfied 
Answers 
Total No. of 
Unsatisfied 
Answers 
% of 
Satisfaction 
Q1. Can you identify the "Business Asset" in 
figure 1? 
50 41 38 3 92.68 
Q2. Can you identify the "IS Asset" in figure 1? 50 41 37 4 90.24 
Q3. Which of the following is represented as 
"Attack Method" in figure 1? 
50 41 35 6 85.36 
Q4. Which of the following represents a 
"Vulnerability" in figure 1? 
50 41 36 5 87.80 
Q5. Which of the following represents a 
"Security Criterion" in figure 1? 
50 41 31 10 75.60 
Q6. Which of the following represent the 
"Security Requirement" in figure 1?  
50 41 36 5 87.80 
Q7. Which of the following represent an 
"Impact" in figure 1?  
50 41 33 8 80.48 
Q8. Can you identify a "Threat Agent" in figure 
1? 
50 41 40 1 97.56 
Q9. Which of the following represent a "Risk" 
in figure 1? 
50 41 30 11 73.17 
Q10. Which of the following represent a 
"Threat" in figure 1? 
50 41 34 7 82.92 
Q11. Which of the following represent an 
"Event" in figure 1? 
50 41 32 9 78.04 
Q12. Which of the following represent a "Risk 
Treatment" in figure 1? 
50 41 33 8 80.48 
Q13. Which of the following represent a 
"Control" in figure 1? 
50 41 23 18 56.09 
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Table 6.2 Comprehensibility of SROMUC 
Questions Business 
Analysts 
Software  
Analysts 
Software 
Security 
Analysts 
Software 
Developers 
Comprehensible and easiness of SROMUC 4 5 4 4 
Satisfaction of alignment of SROMUC and ISSRM 3 4 5 4 
Measuring security risk using SROMUC 3 3 4 3 
 
6.4 Threat to Validity 
The ideal approach to measure the comprehensibility and validity may not be possible as 
every approach has it limitations depending on the context it is used in. Possible limitations of 
our approach are:  
- The participants who were unable to answer correctly my not have gone through 
the guidelines to understand SROMUC and ISSRM. Thus, the answer from them 
may be based on their random choice. 
- Repeatedly answering the questions may lead to bias and unrealistic results. 
 
6.5 Summary 
In order to measure the comprehensibility and validate our proposed alignment, we used a 
survey questionnaire to measure the comprehensibility and validity of our work. Then we 
summarised the results of the survey and identified the threats to the validity of our proposal. 
We acknowledge the industrial level case study to validate the correctness and 
comprehensibility of SROMUC.   
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Chapter 7 
Discussion, Conclusion and Future Work 
 
In this chapter, we provide the related work, discussion regarding the research done in this 
thesis and we will conclude our proposal and identify the paths for the future work. 
7.1 Related Work 
The ISSRM domain model not only cover the identification and specification of risks but also 
support the risk management process that focuses on whole IS, instead of defining security 
requirements for one or more IS components. It is applicable during the IS development while 
other approaches are mainly apply on an existing IS, but not applicable during the IS 
development. Although few can be used during the development by implementing the 
additional guidelines, however, they still lack the Requirement Engineering (RE) activities 
and wouldn’t able to reason for security requirements from the early analysis. In CORAS 
method, the activities proposed a formal artefact but it is neither connected to RE activities 
nor applicable to the IS development and is disconnected from the standard terminology. 
ISSRM domain model integrate the risk management tasks throughout all the stages of IS 
development. Hence, the risk management tasks and IS development go parallel. Herrmann et 
al. [14] present a Risk-based Security Requirement, Elicitation and Prioritization (RiskREP) 
method for managing IT security risks. It defines a set of security requirements, which outline 
how security as the quality goal can be achieved. It performs Business-IT-alignment and 
prioritizes the IT requirement. Similarly, ISSRM align these concepts by supporting the 
definition of security for the key IS constituents and addresses the IS security risk 
management process at three different conceptual levels, i.e., asset-related, risk-related, and 
risk treatment-related concepts.  
There has been several work carried out on misuse cases and its extension. McDer-
mott and Fox proposed abuse cases. They explored how threats and counter-measures could 
be modelled using standard UML use case but keeping abuse cases in separate model. Abuse 
case focuses on security requirements where as our approach is aligned with ISSRM and 
focuses on the overall security risk management. It identifies the vulnerability and threats, and 
analyses the potential risk and its impact. Therefore, the elicited security requirements are 
aligned with the functional requirements of system. Alexander [3] used the notion of how 
security use cases can be threatened by other misuse cases. The SROMUC is based on the 
ISSRM process where the activities are iterative that identifies the risk associated with the 
security use case and helps to counter measures. Matulevicius et al. [17] has also aligned 
misuse cases with ISSRM but their work is not completely aligned with the security risk 
management strategies. However, our proposal is the extension of the work done by 
Matulevicius et al. [17] and provides the modelling support for overall security risk 
management strategy of an organization at early development stage. 
7.2 Limitations 
Like any other research work, this research has few limitations. Firstly, our work is based on 
the theoretical description; hence it contains a certain level of subjectivity. Also our work is 
focused on the comprehensibility; hence the correctness and effectiveness remains a question.  
The research work is based on specific banking IS scenario which may mean that some 
aspects of SROMUC and its application can be interpreted differently, if performed by other 
researchers in reference to ISSRM domain model. Secondly, we have decided to reduce the 
risk by implementing certain security requirements but the security requirement could be 
different if decision of risk avoidance is taken.  
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7.2 Conclusion 
We presented and analyzed different security risk management frameworks and methods such 
as EBIOS, OCTAVE, SQUARE etc, and discussed the ISSRM domain model for security risk 
management. We decided to use ISSRM domain model for the alignment of SROMUC 
because of its coverage for security risk management and focus on IS development. Also 
ISSRM domain model is compliant with existing security risk management methods and 
covers most important aspect for security risk management. Another reason for choosing 
ISSRM domain model is that it is already used for the alignment of misuse cases by 
Matulevicius et al [17]. We analyzed the concepts and constructs of different security 
modelling languages (e.g., Misuse case diagrams, Secure Tropos diagrams). This analysis 
helped to understand the concept, constructs and usage of these languages. After the analysis, 
we have resulted in a SROMUC for security risk management at requirement elicitation and 
analysis stage. In our analysis, we investigated that SROMUC can be used for security risk 
management as it identifies and  provides the construct for assets, risk and event and security 
requirement in reference to ISSRM domain model. Investigation of existing language 
alignments helped us to understand and analyze the modelling language at requirement 
elicitation and analysis stage. 
After analysing the security modelling languages, we decided to align misuse case 
diagrams to ISSRM domain model because of the need of security risk management at early 
stage and misuse cases can be used to elicit security requirement at requirement elicitation 
and analysis stage. We have used existing alignment of misuse cases by Matulevičius et al 
[17]. We identified the limitations in existing alignment and extend the language syntax and 
semantics in order to respect the guidelines of ISSRM domain model by introducing new 
visual constructs and illustrate it with an online banking IS. The proposed SROMUC 
strengthens existing misuse cases by extending the graphical representation of misuse cases 
and its semantics. The graphical extension proposed are not intuitive but they express the 
security concerns in reference to ISSRM domain model for risk analysis. The idea is to make 
it easily understandable and to comply it with the original definition of use cases. We 
differentiate the construct for impact and security criterion from the standard UML use case 
constructs. Security use case construct has been enhanced to differentiate security requirement 
from the functional requirements. In Table 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, we present the coverage of 
SROMUC with respect to ISSRM domain model. Since, ISSRM domain model is used for the 
alignment of SROMUC and Secure Tropos, we also presented the translation rules between 
SROMUC and Secure Tropos for the interpretability of both the languages in reference to 
ISSRM domain model. 
To validate our work, we have measure the comprehensibility of SROMUC, we 
conducted a survey and include the results in the report and we identify the threats to the 
validity. 
 7.3 Future work 
We have applied our proposal to the running online banking IS example. However, we 
acknowledge more practice-oriented case study is necessary for the quality and correctness of 
SROMUC with regards to security risk management. The scope of this work is limited to the 
graphical representation of SROMUC but the alignment and extension of textual template of 
MUC with ISSRM domain model can be treated as a future work in this context. Our focus 
was on the comprehensibility of SROMUC, hence the correctness and effectiveness will 
remain the subject for future work. We have provided the transformation with secure tropos 
for interoperability but it also opens the doors for interoperability with other security 
modelling languages.    
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Abstract Eesti 
Viimine väärkasutamine juhtudel ISSRM 
Inam Soomro  
Magistritöö 
 
Digitaalse ja sotsiaalse elu vaheline piirjoon on hägunemas ning informatsiooni süsteemide 
turvalisuse ja informatsiooni per se turvalisus tekitab muret. Samuti pälvib tähelepanu 
süsteemide turvalisuse arendamine ja säilitamine. Olemasolevad uurimused viitavad 
mitmetele juhtumitele, kus turvalisuse aspekti võeti arvesse ainult süsteemi väljatöötamise 
protsessi lõpus, jättes välja süstemaatilise turvalisuse analüüsi süsteemi ja tarkvara  nõuete ja  
kavandamise etappidel.  
Misuse case diagrams on üks võimalikke viise seostada turvalisuse analüüsi ja süsteemi 
funktusionaalsete nõuete definitsiooni. Nende peamine eesmärk on  negatiivsete 
stsenaariumite modeleerimine, seoses defineeritud süsteemi funktsionaalsete nõuete 
esilekutsumise ja analüüsiga. Hoolimata sellest eelisest on väärkasutatud juhtumid üsna 
ebatäpsed; nad ei täida riskianalüüsi organiseerimise strateegiaid, ja seega võivad viia 
valetõlgendamiseni turvalisusega seotud konseptsioonides. Sellised limitatsioonid võivad 
potentsiaalselt viia puudulike lahendusteni turvalisuse alal. Sageli tuleb organisatsioonidel 
leida enda turvalisuse lahendused, et kaitsta oma ressursse ja varasid.  
Käesolevas töös rakendame süstemaatilist lähenemist, et mõista kuidas Misuse case diagrams 
aitavad organiseerida ettevõtete varasid, potentsiaalseid süsteemiriske ja turvalisuse nõudeid, 
et leevendada riske. 
Täpsemalt ühtlustame Misuse case konstruktsiooni domeeni mudeli kontseptiga, 
informatsiooni süsteemi turvalisusriski haldamiseks (Information Systems Security Risk 
Management; ISSRM). Lisaks, põhinedes ISSRM ja keelelisele ühtlustamisele, uurime ja 
arendame reeglid, et tõlkida Misuse cas diagrams Secure Tropos mudelile.  
Käesoleva uurimuse panusel on mitmeid eeliseid. Esmalt aitab potentsiaalselt mõista, kuidas 
Misuse case turvalisuse riski haldamisega tegeleb. Teiseks määratleb meetodi, mis toetab 
turvalisuse nõuete põhjendamist arendatud süsteemi kehtestamisel ja rakendamisel. 
Viimaseks, Secure Troposi transformeerumine aitab potentsiaalselt arendajatel (ja teistel 
süsteemi vahendajatel) mõista miks turvalisuse lahendused on olulised ning millised on 
erinevate huvigruppide kompromissid.  
Plaanime kinnitada saadud tulemused, kus mudeli kvaliteet seoses selle arusaadavusega on 
mõõdetud Misuse case diagram jaoks. 
Usume, et selline Misuse case seadistamine koos ISSRM ja Misuse case diagram 
transformeerumine eesmärgile orienteeritud modelleerumisele, on kasulik süsteemi ja tarkvara 
arendajatele.  
Esmalt aitab mõista turvalisusega seotud probleeme varajastes arendamise staadiumites. 
Teiseks aitab vaadata probleemi erinevatest vaatenurkadest, mõistes erinevaid turvalisuse 
arendamise perspektiive. 
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Apendix A Online Survey 
 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/embeddedform?formkey=dGI2MWF5X1RtTXJwNzN0QVNkOU
15NHc6MQ 
In Appendix A, we present the online questionnaire conducted for measuring the 
comprehensibility of SROMUC which was sent to IS practitioners. Questionnaire was given 
as a multiple choice questions from where participant had to identify the correct answer.  
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Appendix B – Online Questionnaire Results 
We present the online questionnaire results in Appendix B in the raw format. The survey 
questions are listed in the first column and the following columns contain the answers of the 
participants. 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AvJlLwD0MIo5dGI2MWF5X1RtTXJwNzN0Q
VNkOU15NHc&pli=1#gid=0
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Appendix C – Research Paper Submitted to an International Workshop 
A research paper submitted to SBP'12 JOINT WORKSHOP ON SECURITY IN BUSINESS 
PROCESSES in conjunction with the 10th International Conference on Business Process 
Management (BPM 2012). 
http://www.inf.unibz.it/sbp12/papers/P5-Soomro.pdf 
Appendix D – Research Paper 
 
Towards Security Risk-oriented Misuse Cases 
Inam Soomro and Naved Ahmed 
Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu 
 J. Liivi 2, 50409 Tartu, Estonia 
{inam, naved}@ut.ee 
Abstract. Security has turn out to be a necessity of information systems (ISs) and information per se. 
Nevertheless, existing practices report on numerous cases when security aspects were considered only at the 
end of the development process, thus, missing the systematic security analysis. Misuse case diagrams help 
identify security concerns at early stages of the IS development. Despite this fundamental advantage, misuse 
cases tend to be rather imprecise; they do not comply with security risk management strategies, and, thus, 
could lead to misinterpretation of the security-related concepts. Such limitations could potentially result in 
poor security solutions. This paper applies a systematic approach to understand how misuse case diagrams 
could help model organisational assets, potential risks, and security countermeasures to mitigate these risks. 
The contribution1 helps understand how misuse cases could deal with security risk management and support 
reasoning for security requirements and their implementation in the software system.  
Keywords: Security risk management, Misuse cases, Security engineering, Information system security 
                                               
1 We would like to express our gratitude to Dr. Raimundas Matulevičius for his invaluable contributions in completing this 
research.  
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1 Introduction  
During the last two decades, line between digital and social life is diminishing, leading that modern society is 
mainly dependent on information system (IS) and its security. The demand for IS security is constantly growing. 
Also developing and maintaining system security is increasingly gaining attention. Consideration of IS security 
at the early stages of software development is also acknowledged in [18]. The security breaches in IS can lead to 
the negative consequences. The practitioners of IS security must inspect security threats with a negative 
perspective from the very beginning of IS development process. Consideration of security at early development 
stages assists to analyse and estimate security measures of the IS to be developed. 
This paper discusses the security risk management at requirement elicitation and analysis stage. We will consider 
the question “how security risk management could be addressed using misuse case diagrams?”. To answer this 
question we analyse misuse cases proposed by Sindre and Opdahl [18]. The misuse case diagrams [17, 18] are 
one of the possible techniques to relate security analysis and functional requirements of software systems. The 
main goal is to model negative scenarios with respect to functional requirements. The misuse cases are already 
proved to be useful in industry [15]. Existing misuse cases is relatively a simple language, since it contains few 
constructs to model security concerns. However the previous analysis [9] showed several limitations of misuse 
cases; for example, misuse cases do not comply with security risk management strategies, because they lack 
several concrete constructs to address secure assets, security risks and their countermeasures; misuse cases lack 
distinct constructs for representing security risk concepts. These limitations could result in misinterpretation of 
the security-related concepts leading to poor security solutions. In this paper we tend to propose few 
improvement to the misuse cases diagrams.  
We apply a systematic approach to understand how misuse case diagrams could help to model organisational 
assets, potential system risks, and security requirements to mitigate these risks. More specifically we introduce 
new constructs to extend the misuse cases in order to align their constructs with the concepts of Information 
Systems Security Risk Management (ISSRM) domain model [11,12]. The benefit of syntactical and semantic 
extensions is that they introduce the missing semantics in to the language. The domain model is a touchstone to 
verify if the concepts presented are acceptable and appropriate for the security risk management. 
The structure of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we provide background knowledge needed for 
our study. In Section 3, we describe our research method and introduce Security Risk-oriented Misuse Cases 
(SROMUC) through an online banking example [1,8]. Next we discuss alignment of SROMUC to ISSRM. In 
Section 4 we review the related work, discuss our results and conclude our study. 
2 Background 
2.1 Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM)  
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) [11,12] is a systematic approach, which addresses the 
security related issues in an IS domain. The model is defined after a survey of risk management and security 
related standards, security risk management methods and software engineering frameworks [12]. The domain 
model (see Fig. 1) supports the alignment of security modelling languages. It improves the IS security and 
security modelling languages as it conforms to the security risk management of organizations. The model 
describes three different conceptual categories: 
Asset-related concepts describe the organization’s assets grouped as business asset and IS asset. It also defines 
the security criterion as a constraint of a business asset expressed as integrity, confidentiality and availability. 
Risk-related concepts define risk, potential harm to business, it is composed of a threat that contains one or 
more vulnerabilities, if executed successfully, harms the system assets which has negative consequences on 
assets defined as an impact. They negate the security criterion imposed by the business asset. An event is an 
abstraction aggregated as a threat and vulnerability where vulnerability is a weakness in a system that can be 
exploited by threat agent. A threat is a way to inflict an attack. It harms IS and business asset carried out by a 
threat agent and an attack method to target IS assets. Threat Agent is an attacker that initiates a threat to harm the 
IS asset. Attack Method is a mean through which a threat agent executes a threat. 
Risk treatment related concepts define a risk treatment decision to avoid, reduce, retain, or transfer the 
potential risks. It is refined by the security requirement. A control implements the security requirement. 
The ISSRM process [11,12] is a 6-step process, based on existing risk analysis methodologies and standards. It 
starts with context and asset identification of the organization, proceeding to determine the security objectives 
for identified assets. Next, risk analysis and assessment to examine and estimate potential risks and its impacts. 
In next step, risk treatment decisions are taken to identify the security requirements. Finally, security control is 
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implemented as security requirement. The process is iterative which may identify new risks and security 
controls. 
 
 
Fig. 1. ISSRM Domain Model [11] 
2.2 Misuse Cases 
Misuse cases are proposed by Sindre and Opdhal in [18]. They have extended the standard UML use cases to 
model security concerns at the early stages of software system development. The misuse cases include both the 
graphical notation and textual representation. Sindre and Opdahl define misuse case as a list or sequence of 
steps, if performed by an agent successfully, cause harm to the stakeholder and/or to the system. They define 
misuser as an actor that is willing to use the system with unfavourable intents. Initially, only threats were 
modelled as misuse cases. Later on, Sindre and Opdahl adapted the concept of security use case discussed by 
Firesmith [6] where security use cases are defined as a function to protect the system assets from the identified 
risks. In [16] Røstad has extended the misuse cases with a concept of vulnerability as weakness of the system 
(see a grey-filled use case in Fig. 3). 
3 Security Risk-oriented Misuse Cases (SROMUC)  
This section describes the research method used to develop SROMUC. We illustrate SROMUC using three 
different security scenarios on asset integrity (see Fig. 2, 3, and 4), confidentiality (see Fig. 5), and availability 
(see Fig. 6) in an example of online banking. This section results in a conceptual alignment between SROMUC 
and ISSRM domain model. 
3.1  Research Method 
The main research objective of this study is to enable misuse cases to support the security risk management 
during the IS development. We followed a 3-step research method: firstly, we conduct literature review of 
security in IS and the ISSRM domain model to identify the security risk concepts. Secondly, we investigate how 
the misuse case diagrams express the security risk concepts. Hence, we observed the limitations of misuse cases 
in modelling the ISSRM concepts and executing the risk management process. Lastly, we define misuse case 
extensions, thus resulting in the Security Risk-oriented Misuse Cases (SROMUC). The extensions are done on 
all three components of the modelling language, namely concrete syntax, meta-model and semantics.  
3.2 Scenario 1: SROMUC Modelling for Integrity 
We illustrate the application of SROMUC using the online banking example [1, 8]. This scenario is particularly 
focussed on the IS integrity. To achieve better understandability, we split the scenario to 3 models2: one for 
assets (see Fig. 2), one for security threats (see Fig. 3), and one for security requirements (see Fig. 4).  
                                               
2 To create these models we use the Microsoft Visio tool. 
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Fig. 2. Asset Modelling 
Asset model. In Fig. 2, we illustrate the context of an online banking IS in a use case diagram. A security 
criterion is a security constraint imposed on business use case (i.e., business asset). The example focusses on the 
bank customer and bank officer who both communicate with Banking IS. The Bank Customer and Bank Officer 
are the assets characterising the users of the system in reference to ISSRM domain model. The bank customer 
seeks to Perform Transaction and bank officer seeks to Keep Account Data Up To Date. The Perform 
Transaction includes two use cases Pay Money and Keep Account Data Up To Date and extends Perform 
Transaction Via Online. Perform Transaction has a security criterion Integrity of Transaction represented as a 
hexagon (see Fig. 2) as it characterises a security constraint of a business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction). In 
Fig. 2, a dotted line with stereo type constraints of is linked from business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction) to 
security criterion (i.e., Integrity of Transaction) shows the relationship between the two. According to ISSRM 
domain model we identified Perform Transaction as the business asset that has some business value. Hence 
Perform Transaction Via Online supports the business asset and is considered as an IS asset. 
Risk model. In Fig. 3, we model the potential security threat scenario. A misuser (i.e., Attacker) initiates a 
misuse case (i.e., Intercept Money includes Transfer money to another account and Change details of 
transaction) by exploiting the vulnerability (i.e., Unsecure Network Channel) in a use case (i.e., IS asset). 
Following [10] in Fig. 3, this vulnerability is represented by filled grey use case. The misuse case Intercept 
Payment threatens the use case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS Asset). The threat Intercept Money leads 
to an impact (i.e., Money Transferred to Unintended Account) which harms the business use case (i.e., Perform 
Transaction) and disaffirms the security criterion (i.e., Integrity of Transaction). An impact is a state of system 
that is represented as rounded rectangle (see Fig. 3). A misuse case is linked to impact using leads to 
relationship. On one hand, an impact disaffirms the security criterion linked with negates relationship. On 
another hand impact harms a business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction).  
 
Fig. 3. Threat Modelling 
Risk treatment model. The ISSRM domain model defines the risk treatment, control and its implementation. 
However, SROMUC does not support the modelling of these concepts but security requirement is modelled as a 
security use case. The security use case is represented as a use case with a lock inside (see Fig. 4). In Fig. 4, we 
present the security requirement for identified threats. The use case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS 
Asset) includes a security use cases (i.e., Apply Cryptographic Procedures and Use Secure Communication 
Protocol). The security use case mitigates the misuse case (i.e., Intercept Money). It ensures security criterion 
(i.e., Integrity of Payment) imposed by business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction). 
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Fig. 4. Security Requirement Modelling 
3.3 Scenario 2: SROMUC Modelling for Availability 
In Fig. 5, we model an online banking IS [1, 8] for Availability of Service. In our example, the business use case 
(i.e., Perform Transaction) has a constraint of security criterion (i.e., Availability Of Online Service). The 
misuser (i.e., Attacker) initiates a misuse case (i.e., Make Online Service Unavailable includes Initiate Half 
Opened Connections To Server). It exploits the vulnerability (i.e., Allow Unlimited Number Of Connections) 
included in a use case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS Asset). The misuse case Make Online Service 
Unavailable threatens use case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS asset) and leads to an impact (i.e., 
Availability Of Service Is Compromised), moreover, it harms the business use case Perform Transaction. The 
impact of the misuse case negates the security criterion. 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Modelling for Availability of Service                                 
3.4 Scenario 3: SROMUC Modelling for Confidentiality 
In Fig. 6, we model the example of an online banking IS [1, 8] for the Confidentiality Of Data. In this example, 
the business use case (i.e., Perform Transaction) has a constraint of security criterion (i.e., Confidentiality Of 
Transaction). The use case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS asset) includes another use case (i.e., Ensure 
Account privacy includes Enter PIN Code) for securing an online transaction. The misuser (i.e., Attacker) 
initiates a misuse case (i.e., Steal Account Data includes Retrieve Transaction Data includes Disclose 
Transaction Data) by exploiting the vulnerability (i.e., Data Is Not Encrypted and Accept Malicious Data). The 
misuse case (i.e., Steal Account Data) threatens the use case Perform Transaction Via Online (i.e., IS asset) and 
leads to an impact (i.e., Confidentiality Of Data Is Compromised), moreover, It also harms the business use case 
(i.e., Perform Transaction). The impact of the misuse case negates the security criterion. 
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Fig. 6. Modelling for Confidentiality of Data 
3.5 Concept Alignment of SROMUC and ISSRM 
In [9] authors discuss the alignment between the misuse cases and the ISSRM domain model. However it 
presents only the correspondences, overlaps or/and similarities. In this section we describe the alignment of 
SROMUC with the concepts found in ISSRM domain model. In Table 1, 2 and 3, first column outlines the 
ISSRM concepts. The second column expresses their synonyms found in the literature. The third column 
distinguishes the concepts and relationship. The last column defines the SROMUC visual constructs. 
Alignment of asset-related concepts. In Table 1, we introduce SROMUC syntax to represent the ISSRM asset-
related concepts. In ISSRM domain model, assets correspond to Actor and Use case in SROMUC. The business 
asset and the IS asset are modelled as a use case. The supports relationship in ISSRM between IS asset and 
business assets is expressed using extends and includes relationships. We introduce hexagon construct in 
SROMUC to represent the ISSRM security criterion. A security criterion is the constraint on business asset 
therefore the hexagon is linked to business use case through dotted line with constraint of relationship. 
Table 7. Asset Related Concepts (C – Concept, R – Relationships) 
ISSRM Concepts Synonyms Type SROMUC Syntax 
Assets  C 
 actor 
Business Asset Business Use Case C 
 
IS Asset IS Use Case C 
 
Security Criterion Security Constraint C 
 
Supports - R  <<extends>>  ,                  
<<includes>> 
Constraints of Restriction R                   <<constraints of>> 
 
Alignment of risk-related concepts. In Table 2, we introduce the SROMUC syntax to represent the ISSRM 
risk-related concepts. In SROMUC, a threat agent is represented as misuser, attack method as misuse case and 
vulnerability as a use case filled in grey. A threat is modelled as a combination of misuser and misuse case (i.e., 
misuser communicates with misuse case). The ISSRM targets relationship is represented as an SROMUC 
threatens relationship. We introduced a rounded rectangle to model the impact concept of ISSRM. 
In order to be compliant with ISSRM domain model, we also introduce the exploits, leads to, harms and negates 
relationships. Exploits relationship defines a link between misuse case and the vulnerability whereas the leads to 
relationship defines a link between the misuse case and the impact. The harms relationship defines the link 
between an impact and a business use case whereas a negates relationship defines a link between an impact and 
the security criterion (see Table 2). We combine the concepts of threat agent, attack method, vulnerability, and 
impact all together to represent an event, where a risk is understood as a combination of event and the impact. 
Alignment of risk treatment-related concepts. In risk treatment-related concepts, we update the visual syntax 
of security use case by adding a padlock to security use case, which represents security requirement (see Table 
3). The ISSRM mitigates relationship is modelled with mitigates relationship from security use cases (i.e., 
security requirement) to misuse case in SROMUC. 
Table 8. Alignment of Risk related Concepts(C – Concepts, R – Relationships) 
ISSRM Concepts Synonym
s 
Type SROMUC Syntax 
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Risk Hazard C 
 
Impact Effect C 
 
Event Incident C 
 
Attack Method Violence C 
 
Vulnerability Weakness C 
 
Threat Agent Attacker C 
 
Threat Hazard C 
 
Exploits - R                            <<exploits>> 
Negates Denies,  R                            <<negates>> 
Harms             - R                              <<harms>> 
Leads to - R                            <<leads to>> 
Characteristics of - R    <<includes>>                        <<extends>> 
Uses - R  
Table 9. Risk Treatment related Concepts (C – Concepts, R – Relationships) 
ISSRM Concepts Synonyms Type SROMUC Syntax 
Risk Treatment  C  
Security Requirement Countermeasure C 
 
Control  C - 
Refines  R - 
Mitigates Diminishes R    <<mitigates>> 
Implements   - 
3.6 Abstract Syntax of Security Risk-oriented Misuse Cases 
In Section 3.1, we presented the SROMUC before abstract syntax due to the simple introduction of the language. 
However, to illustrate the application of proposed SROMUC, we need to introduce its abstract syntax in Fig. 7. 
The major elements in the meta-model are an Actor OR Misuser and Use OR Misuse Case. Actor OR Misuser 
initiates the communication to interact with Use OR Misuse Case. Their cardinality shows that an Actor or 
Misuser can communicate with one or more Use or Misuser Case. Actor and misuser are the specialisations of an 
Actor OR Misuser. Use Or Misuse case can includes or extends another Use OR Misuse Case. The Use Case, 
Vulnerability and Misuse Case are the specialization of Use OR Misuse Case. The Use Case includes one or 
more Vulnerabilities that can be exploited by one or more misuse cases. A Misuse Case threatens (i.e., 
threatening) one or more use cases. A Misuse Case Leads To one or more Impact. An Impact Harms one or more 
use cases (see Fig. 3) by negating one or more Security Criterion define as Constraint Of on that use case. A 
Security Use Case is a specialised Use Case that Mitigates one or more Misuse Cases.  
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Fig. 7. Meta-model of SROMUC 
4 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analysed how misuse cases can be used to manage security risks at the early stages of the 
IS development. Firstly, we identified the limitations in existing misuse cases with respect to the ISSRM domain 
model. Secondly, we extend the language syntax and semantics to respect the ISSRM domain model (see, Tables 
1, 2 and 3). This work is a part of the larger effort to align several modelling languages to the ISSRM model that 
define the semantics at full extend and develop a systematic model transformation-based approach for secure IS 
development. 
4.1 Related work 
Security Risk Management. The ISSRM covers the identification and specification of security risks, and also 
supports the risk management process, which focusses on the whole IS, instead of defining security requirements 
for one or more IS components. The ISSRM approach could potentially be applicable during the IS development 
while other approaches (see details in [11]) are mainly focused on an existing IS (not its development) and also 
lacks the Requirement Engineering (RE) activities [11]. In Automated Risk and Utility Management (AURUM) 
framework [5], when the controls are selected, the decision makers are informed along with the consequences. 
Whereas, ISSRM integrate the risk management tasks throughout all the stages of IS development. Hence, the 
risk management tasks and IS development go parallel. Herrmann et al. [7] present a Risk-based Security 
Requirement, Elicitation and Prioritization (RiskREP) method for managing IT security risks. It defines a set of 
security requirements, which outline how security as the quality goal can be achieved. It performs Business-IT-
alignment and prioritises the IT requirement. Similarly, ISSRM align these concepts by supporting the definition 
of security for the key IS constituents and addresses the IS security risk management process at three different 
conceptual levels (see Section 2.1). 
Misuse cases. There have been few studies carried out on misuse cases and its extension. In [13, 14] McDermott 
and Fox have proposed abuse cases to explore how threats and countermeasures could be modelled using 
standard UML use case but keeping abuse cases in a separate model. Abuse case focusses on security 
requirements whereas our approach is aligned with ISSRM and focusses on the overall security risk 
management. It identifies vulnerabilities and threats, and analyses potential risks and their impacts. Therefore, 
the elicited security requirements are aligned with the functional system requirements. In [2] Alexander has 
considered how security use cases can be threatened by misuse cases. Matulevičius et al. [9] have aligned misuse 
cases with ISSRM however they leave the misuse case extensions for the future development. In this paper the 
extensions of the misuse cases are built on the previous work of Matulevičius et al. [9] and covers the complete 
security risk management strategy of an organisation at the early development stage. 
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4.2 Discussion  
SROMUC is an approach to elicit security requirements at the early stages of the system development. It will 
potentially help designers, architects and analysts to understand the potential threats and security attacks. At both 
the architecture and design stages, risk analysis is a necessity. The SROMUC approach enables the security 
analysts to discover the architectural flaws so that their mitigation could begin early in the system development. 
Otherwise disregarding the risk analysis at this level leads to costly problems later. In practice, system 
stakeholders are not motivated to invest on security concerns, as it does not add direct value to the systems’ 
functionality. The proposed SROMUC strengthens the misuse case diagrams by extending their syntax and 
semantics. The proposed graphical extensions are not intuitive and they related to the security concerns 
supported by the ISSRM domain model. However the primary idea is to keep it comprehensible and to 
compliable with the original definition of (mis)use cases. We differentiate the construct for impact and security 
criterion from the standard UML use case constructs. The security use case construct has been enhanced to 
differentiate security requirements from the functional requirements. In [9] Matulevičius et al. have suggested to 
differentiate the concepts of the IS asset and the business asset. But here, we did not differentiate the assets as it 
changes the definition of original use case construct. We make an exception regarding the security use because it 
addresses the system functionality in terms of security countermeasures. Regarding the completeness of 
alignment between SROMUC and ISSRM domain model, SROMUC does not address the risk treatment and 
control implementation. 
SROMUC is not the only approach that has been aligned to ISSRM domain model. Currently ISSRM is 
becoming a common model [11] to understand security risk modelling using different modelling languages, like 
BPMN [3], Secure Tropos [10], KAOS extensions to security [11], and Mal-activities [4]. Finally, this may lead 
to interoperability between different security languages. 
Although in the online banking example we have illustrated the applicability and performance of our proposal, 
we acknowledge the importance of the industrial case study to validate the SROMUC in the practice. As a future 
work, we also plan to experiment the language in a case study to validate its usefulness and effectiveness. 
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